[cups.bugs] [MOD] STR #2368: Current setuid() approach of deviced leads to unaccessible devices

[Martin Pitt]

Hi,

Michael Sweet [2007-04-30  9:51 -0400]:
> Sigh...  seteuid() becomes the only UID after a fork. 

fork() does not change effective and real user IDs, and deviced does
not even fork().

> The cups-deviced check honors the root/non-root permission check
> done by the scheduler, and your patch disables that, running all
> backends as root with the standard CUPS (and that exposes you to
> more security risks...)

Grr, can you pretty please look at the patch and my explanation first?

The patch touches *deviced*, not *cupsd*, does not change backend
invocation behaviour, it does not disable any permission checks, and
seteuid() does not help you security-wise in any way with getuid()==0.

Regards,

Martin

-- 
Martin Pitt        http://www.piware.de
Ubuntu Developer   http://www.ubuntu.com
Debian Developer   http://www.debian.org
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